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D.R.O.

(Sgd.) *AK*

Date *23/11/76*

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H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

DEPT.  
or POST

FILE No. *R 3/548/4* (Part *1*)

TITLE: *POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN*  
*IRAQ AND UNITED KINGDOM.*

REFER TO

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NAME  
(and dept. when necessary)

TO  
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*Registry*  
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*12/6*

*R*

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*17/X*

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*17/X*

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*7*

*3/7*

*R*

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*25*

*21/X*  
*21/X*

*R*

*GSB*

*8*

*5/8*

*R*

*GSB*

*26/27*

*22/X*  
*23/X*

*R*

*GSB*

*9+10*

*5/8*

*R*

*GSB*

*29*

*23/X*

*McClark*

*R*

*16/8*

*7/8*

*R*

*GSB*

*30*

*6/X*  
*6/11*

*GSB*

*9+10*

*7/8*

*R*

*GSB*

*31*

*18/X*

*R*

*GSB*

*12/13*

*30-9*

*RID Mr Simon*

*31*

*18/21*

*R*

*GSB*

*1-10*

*2/8*

*Mr Burton MEB*

*31*

*31/X*

*GSB*

*15*

*2/X*

*R*

*31/X*

Registry Address

Room No. *W. 92*

*23/11/76*

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*1974*

HPW 11



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RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No 35

21 MAY 1974

NBR 3/548/3

British Embassy,  
Baghdad.

1/1

5 May 1974

G.S. Burton Esq.,  
Middle East Department,  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,  
London.

Copy ① by Gardner DT/  
② GIPD  
20/5

Mr Williams 15.  
Mr Glan  
21/5

Dear Graham,

I had a good talk with Sd Shadhil Taqa on 4 May. The atmosphere was very friendly, informal and encouraging. Naturally, Miss Bakr was present.

2. As we had no news on the appointment of Ambassadors or arrival of an economic mission I covered these points first to get them out of the way. I said that I had heard informally that a First Secretary Chargé would be appointed in late June. He made a special point of saying that the new Chargé would be welcome but he hoped this would not mean that I was to leave soon. I should at least stay for some months. On the appointment of Ambassadors he hoped ours would speak Arabic. I asked whether they had in mind an Ambassador for London, and in response to questioning said that Talib Shibab had been named in the Beirut press, and both the Minister of the Interior and the Foreign Minister had been in London before the resumption of relations, and this had given rise to speculation in the Diplomatic Corps in Baghdad about the identity of the new Iraqi Ambassador there. He had heard these rumours, but had no news. When the appointment was made it would be sudden (and was outside the influence of the MFA).

3. On the economic mission I repeated a remark from the Ministry of Economy about them coming before July and August. He said they would be welcome at any time; the importance of an economic and technical co-operation agreement with Britain overrode climatic considerations, even in the height of summer. Iraq was satisfied with the promotion and development of our relations since resumption but it was time the train got on the rails. Ambassadors should be appointed and contacts begun for concluding the economic agreement. This would help Britains balance of payments. Visa policy could be normalised. Cultural links widened - a complete resumption in all respects.

4. I spoke of the Heads of Mission conference and said I was fortunate to be asked to join this meeting, of which he had heard in the press. It was customary from time to time to have regional gatherings of this kind. This particular idea had been canvassed by the previous government and the proposal retained after the election. It did not indicate any change in Britains Middle East policy, but was clear evidence of our continuing interest in the area. Taqa agreed that the conference would be useful, and that our policies here were unlikely to change for the worse as a result.

/5.....

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GR 280

PRIORITY

CYPHER CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BAGHDAD 300700Z

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 31 MAY 1974 NBR 31/528/4
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TOP COPY

TO PRIORITY ECO TEL NO 170 OF 30 MAY, 1974.

MY TEL 169.

CONVERSATION WITH U/SECY TAQA.

IN A 30 MIN TALK SURROUNDING THE SUBJECT OF MILITARY WOUNDED (MTUR) TAQA MANAGED TO GIVE A VIEW ON OTHER POINTS.

2. ISRAEL/SYRIA AGREEMENT.

HE TOLD ME OF PRESIDENT NIXONS ANNOUNCEMENT 15 MINS BEFORE OUR APPT. HE HAD TO SAY THE AGREEMENT WAS UNFORTUNATE BUT I DO NOT THINK HE MEANT IT. I SAID HMG HAD SUPPORTED DR KISSINGERS EFFORTS AND WOULD BE PLEASED HE HAD SUCCEEDED. TAQA COMMENTED THAT KISSINGER WAS NO DOUBT CELEBRATING NOW WITH HIS RELATIVES IN TEL AVIV.

3. APPOINTMENT OF AMBASSADORS

TAQA ASKED FOR NEWS. I SAID AGAIN I HOPED FOR <sup>ADVICE</sup> ~~A HOUSE~~ SOON BUT HAD <sup>HAD</sup> NO INSTRUCTIONS YET. HE SAID HE REALISED THAT AS THEY HAD BROKEN OFF RELATIONS IT WAS FOR THEM TO APPOINT AN AMBASSADOR FIRST. THEY WERE GENUINELY LOOKING CAREFULLY FOR THE RIGHT MAN TO REBUILD ANGLO IRAQI RELATIONS. IT WAS A DIFFICULT TASK AND THEY HAD NOT FOUND HIM YET. FOR OUR PART I SAID I WAS SURE WE HAD SOME GOOD MEN TO CHOOSE FROM.

4. KURDS.

HE MENTIONED THE KURDISH CONFERENCE IN LONDON ( MY LETTER OF 5 MAY) I TOLD HIM I HAD REPORTED HIS VIEWS AND THESE HAD BEEN NOTED. HE SAID HE HOPED THE KURDS WISHING TO ATTEND IT WOULD NOT RECEIVE BETTER TREATMENT THAN KAHTAN SHAKIR (MY TEL 160).

CONFIDENTIAL

/ 5.



5. THE LATTER, HE TOLD ME INCIDENTALLY, IS BEING POSTED TO BERLIN TO SAVE US FURTHER WORRY. WE BOTH LAUGHED. I THANKED HIM FOR THE NEWS.

6. OTHER SUBJECTS MENTIONED WERE ELLIS, ECONOMIC TALKS AND OUR M.E. AMBASSADORS CONFERENCE.

RECORD BY BAG

MCCLUNEY

FILES

MED

PUSD

NEWS DEPT

POD

NENAD

PROT & CONF DEPT

TRED

FRD

PS TO PUS

MR CAMPBELL

MR WEIR

SIR G ARTHUR

MR THOMSON

MR WHITEHEAD

MR MARSHALL





5. Taqa spoke about Kurds and publicity. They appreciated that the BBC Arabic news did not carry the same items as the World Service, but found some of the arabic items **started** towards support of the "insurgent followers of Barazani". (He specifically avoided referring to these as Kurds). For this they blamed the Arabs in the BBC, over whom the English speaking management may have less control! Could I point this out in London? I said he would understand that I had no influence on the BBC, to which he replied they had no influence on Tariq as Shaab (the Communist daily here). I said I must read as Shaab more often.

6. On Kurds again he made a further and more serious point. Student followers of Barazani in Europe were thinking of holding a conference during coming months. Such a conference could be bad for the Kurdish people in Iraq. He hoped the British Government would take that into consideration. From now till next year he hoped (we would ensure that) the weather in London was unsuitable for the holding of such a conference there. I made no comment.

7. Middle East - I need not record in detail Taqas monologue here. He took the line that Britains interests lay with the arabs on account of their greater numbers if nothing else. He noted that there had been no new official views expressed recently.

8. Iran - Iran continued to purchase certain British commodities (presumably a reference to arms). Iraq was aware of our alliance with Iran through CENTO (which he called a "Pact"! ). Iraq did not ask for the impossible but Iran was causing them certain difficulties. He explained the principle of "Thalweq" - a median line on the Shatt through the deepest point, etc (my letter 3/17 of 21 April 1974), Iran claimed that through British colonial influence and domination Iraq usurped Iranian rights and they (of all people) wished to rid themselves of the last traces of British imperialism.

9. We also spoke about Ellis and visas - on these points I am writing separately.

*Yours ever*

*lan.*

I. McCluney



GR 50

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CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 100700Z

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TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 190 OF 10 JUNE, 1974.

KURDISH CONFERENCE IN LONDON.

MY LETTER 1/1 OF 5 MAY PARA 6.

TEXT:

TAQA SAID STUDENT FOLLOWERS OF BARAZANI WERE THINKING OF HOLDING A CONFERENCE IN EUROPE DURING COMING MONTHS. HE HOPED HMG WOULD ENSURE LONDON WAS NOT THE VENUE.

2. COPY OF LETTER WAS PASSED TO EMCK GIPD WHO HAS COMMENTED AS PARA 5 IN HIS LETTER PBM5/505/2 OF 31 MAY.

MCCLUNEY

FILES

MED

GIPD

MR CAMPBELL

MR WEIR

CONFIDENTIAL



## IRAQ/KURDS

I was summoned to see Sd Taqa, U/Secy MFA at 8.30 p.m. on 28 May. (He very kindly postponed the appointment from 7.00 until 8.30 as I was holding a cocktail party in honour of the British Council Representative from 6.30 - 8.30 p.m.).

2. He first welcomed me back from London and the Ambassadors Conference. He had heard a report of my talk with Miss Bakr. He hoped the Conference had given us a good opportunity to discuss the Middle East situation. I did not expand on this.

3. He told me that at 8.15 p.m. President Nixon had announced an agreement between Syria and Israel. He prefaced this line with unfortunately but I did not think he meant it. I said that the S of S had very much hoped Dr K would be successful and would no doubt welcome the agreement. Taqa thought Dr K would now be celebrating with his relations in Tel Aviv.

4. He asked about Sir Donald Maitland. I said he had welcomed the news about Ellis and had taken action to press for an early economic mission. Things were moving on this now. On Ellis, Taqa said he was an old man and he should now stay outside Iraq. The only reason he had been released at all was because of my intervention and that of Sir D. Maitland. On the economic mission he repeated that Iraq was ready for our approach.

5. He asked if there was news of an Ambassador. I said that I hoped to hear something soon but there was no news as yet. For their part Taqa said he realised that as they had broken relations it was for them to nominate someone first. They were looking hard for the right man to rebuild Anglo-Iraq relations. It needed a special touch. I said that I was sure we could find a good man for our Ambassador in Iraq.

6. The real meat of the conversation turned on military casualties from the North. (I had warning of this from my French and Austrian colleagues who had been earlier to the Ministry). It was no secret, said Taqa, that there were clashes (and exchanges of fire) between Government forces and Kurdish forces and the followers of Mulla Mustapha Barazani. There were small numbers of wounded officers and men who needed medical treatment overseas. Would HMG accept in principle that these Iraqi soldiers could be treated in British hospitals, military or civilian. Naturally the full costs of treatment would fall to Iraq. Full details will be given later, but the numbers were small. There would be a continuing need for help over the next 3 or 4 months.

/7.....



7. I said at once that a continuous stream of medical cases went to Britain almost daily. In urgent cases we would give as much assistance as possible (Escorts however had been a problem in the past) I asked if more help than usual was required. Would the cases come through normal channels or was there a special MFA link? Taqa said this matter was being dealt with by the MFA but of course the initiating department was the Ministry of Defence. I said I would report and ask for your views. Meanwhile we would give normal assistance in all medical cases.

8. Taqa asked about the visa for Kahtan Shakir. I said I had no further information. He told me that we need worry no further; they were transferring him to Berlin instead. We both laughed.

9. He asked about the Kurdish Conference (My tel 10.30pm) Had I any reaction to his request that this should not be held in London. I answered that his views had been reported and noted, but I had no further comment to make. He hoped that the participants in the Conference would not be better treated than Kahtan Shakir.

10. The general tone of the conversation was light, and Taqa covered quickly all present points of mutual interest. The de marche on wounded soldiers was exactly parallel to that made to France and Austria, and I suspect several others. The rest of the talk was bilateral.

11. I am puzzled that he should bother to to raise specially with us this question of wounded. The Iraqis know that they can make normal, and quiet arrangements to send their people to Britain. Taqa himself told me how his wife went to London, while they were serving in Moscow, for a heart complaint (Dr Gibson) I commented that to send her whilst he was Ambassador to Russia seemed a little undiplomatic). There are two possible reasons for approaching a number of countries on this matter:

a. they wish to spread large nos. lightly so that hundreds do not turn up in one capital and cause adverse publicity. This is the view of the French, Austrian and German.

b. they wish to obtain help from a number of Governments for the Government side which can then be turned to their advantage politically - both in-internationally and internally. Colleagues discount this on the grounds that one could always argue humanitarian rather than pro-Baath motives in giving them medical aid.

I. McCluney  
30 May 74



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Reference.....  
(5)

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No 35  
- 4 JUL 1974

NBR 3/28/4

Mr Wright

A, para 6

B, para 9

1 In a conversation with Mr McCluney on 5 May, Sayyid Shadhil Taqa, Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, mentioned the possibility of a Kurdish student conference in a European capital. He did not specify London but said that he hoped we would not allow such a conference to take place. Sayyid Taqa returned to the subject on 28 May in a further conversation with Mr McCluney.

2 I have checked with M&VD and PUSD. Such requests are not uncommon and it is the practice for us to take the line that HMG's normal practice is not to ban or restrict private gatherings in the UK. Participants are, of course, subject to the usual visa regulations. I recommend that we inform Mr McCluney of this line, to be used only if Sayyid Taqa brings up the matter again.

G S Burton  
Middle East Department

12 June 1974

1. This poses a very difficult problem. I

see that Taqa has drawn a direct comparison with our refusal of Shaker's visa. It will certainly backbite our differences with the Iraq Government if we allow a Kurdish Conference here.

2. I realize that it is impossible to refuse

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Hi Clark  
Hi Wright  
minute over.  
B/S/6

Altogether. But I  
hope we can  
provide Mr McCluney  
with some good  
pretexts (? Iranian  
students) who he  
speaks to. Taqa.

Shu 17/6

/Hutny



RECEIVED IN  
RECEIVED IN  
- JUL 1974  
Mr Wright

0

entry to Kurdish representation if they can.

But should we not indirectly try to defer

a conference?

Phu

13  
76

Mr. Butler has seen.

If a Kurdish conference is indeed held in the U.K. it will be awkward. But I feel averse to giving any encouragement to Bayyid Taqa to renew any further requests of us in this tone and frankly see no way at all we could either refuse entry or impede the holding of a conference here. The indirect approach suggested by Mr Wright might work but might conceivably cause Kurdish resentment. If it fails

and possibly open and parliamentary criticism.



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Reference.....

We would be unable to extract  
any mitigating credit at all  
vis à vis Taga for our efforts.

3. In the circumstances I  
recommend we should instruct  
Mr McCune to speak as Mr  
Bowton suggests if he has to.

W. J. S. J.

17/6.

I fear Mr. Williams is right in his  
assessment and agree with Mr. Bowton's line  
to take, which will need however careful  
dressing up to avoid giving offence.

J. S. J.  
17/6

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Mr. Mallett M.D.

✓ Please refer to Mr Wright's minute of 18/6 below. You told me earlier that there were easily available precedents of previous conferences held in the UK and I should be grateful for some recent instances which we could quote to the 1/10/5

Mr. W. Houston 18/6  
Mr. Boulton M.D. was M.D.

The line that is usually taken is that the Home Secretary has no power to ban any meeting in the UK and can only take steps to prevent public disorder arising therefrom. The impending IRA Belfast Conference is a case in point. Since it has been made clear that the Government has power only to exclude individuals whose presence is not conducive to the public good of the UK.

On this case point the Home Secretary would take the view that the political views of a foreign visitor are only important if they create the presumption that he will use the

D.V.  
18/6/57

See  
Extract from  
Home of records

Question  
closed.



Opportunity of a visit to engage in  
unlawful and unconstitutional activities.

There is some advantage in placing the  
emphasis on the fact that these questions  
come under the Home Secretary's prerogative and  
not  
that of the SSI for FC Affairs.

James  
24/1

Mr. Bowton, Jr.

I have spoken to Mr. Mallet  
who is unable to find any other  
examples we could quote to the  
Iraqis. I asked him to check  
again as the present material is so  
thin and after some delay he has  
only been able to find a Palestinian-  
extremist conference in the late 60s  
- equally unsuitable for our purposes.  
I think we will just have to make  
the best of it for Baghdad. PK 3 1/2



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 - 5 JUL 1974 NBR 3/548/4.
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Your reference

R G Giddens Esq  
British Embassy  
BAGHDAD

Our reference NBR 3/548/4

Date 4 July 1974

*Dear Dick,*

*WJ/c  
1<sup>a</sup>*

POSSIBLE KURDISH CONFERENCE IN LONDON

1. In his letter of 5 May (para 6) and his minute of 30 May (para 9) Ian McCluney reported Shadhil Taqa's comments on the possibility that the Kurds might hold a conference in London later this year. You and I discussed this briefly before you left for Baghdad.

2. I hope Taqa will not raise the subject again but if he does you should tell him that we are unaware of any Kurdish plans to hold a meeting here. If he presses you should say that the Home Secretary has no powers to forbid any meeting in the UK and can only take steps to prevent public disorder occurring at such meetings. Foreign participants naturally have to comply with UK immigration regulations before being granted a visa to attend.

*Yours ever  
Graham*

G S Burton  
Middle East Department

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7

Mr Weir

Mr Coles

Mr Goulding

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 - 5 JUL 1974 NBR 3/548/4
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5/7  
AB/PA

## IRAQI NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION

### Problem

A

1. Mr Ennals and Mr Hattersley have been invited to the Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires' reception on 16 July. Should they accept?

### Argument

2. This is the first official Iraqi function to which Ministers have been invited since diplomatic relations between the UK and Iraq were resumed on 10 April. Relations have remained cool, though correct, since the resumption but Shadhil Taqa, the newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in Iraq, has regularly referred to the importance of a "new era" in our relationship.

3. The future pattern of our relations with the Iraqis will probably fall mainly in the commercial field. Following a request from the Iraqis, Ministers have recently agreed the terms of an economic and commercial Memorandum of Understanding which we shall shortly be proposing to Baghdad. Meanwhile our exports to Iraq for the first five months this year were £18.4 million, a 57% increase on the figures for the corresponding period last year.

4. The Iraqis will clearly be watching the level of attendance at the reception and will interpret the presence of an FCO Minister as an indication of our desire to see an improvement in our bilateral relations. The Secretary of State will not be able to attend personally, but I hope very much that Mr Ennals can attend, and consider that it would be useful, though not essential, if Mr Hattersley could also go. I understand that officials in the Department of Trade will be recommending that one of their Ministers should attend if possible.

/Recommendation



Recommendation

5. In the light of the foregoing I recommend
- (i) that Mr Ennals should accept the Iraqi invitation;
  - (ii) that, if convenient, Mr Hattersley might also look in briefly.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'P R H Wright', enclosed within a large, loopy oval flourish.

P R H Wright  
Middle East Department

5 July 1974

cc Sir D Maitland



GR 100


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IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 021000Z

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 270 OF 2 AUGUST, 1974

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUMMONED ME THIS MORNING TO SAY HE HAD JUST RECEIVED INFORMATION SUGGESTING 'KURDISH DISSIDENTS' IN LONDON PLANNED DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST DR IZZAT MUSTAFA, MINISTER OF HEALTH AND MEMBER OF RCC, NOW EN ROUTE LONDON. TAQA ASKED THAT POLICE PROTECTION AGAINST POSSIBLE ATTACK BE PROVIDED.

2. BECAUSE IT IS FRIDAY NO ONE HERE CAN SAY WITH CERTAINTY WHEN DR MUSTAFA WILL ARRIVE IN LONDON NOR GIVE HIS ADDRESS. TAQA SAID THAT HE WAS BELIEVED TO BE PASSENGER ON BOAC AIRCRAFT LEAVING BEIRUT AT 1 PM LOCAL TIME TODAY. IRAQ EMBASSY MAY BE ABLE TO GIVE FURTHER INFORMATION.

GIDDENS

BT

FILES  
MED  
SECURITY DEPT  
PUSD  
MVD  
IRD  
NEWS DEPT  
PS/MR ENNALS  
SIR O WRIGHT  
SIR G ARTHUR  
MR WEIR


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*Mr Birgen Shaw*  
*Mr Williams has*  
*separately*  
*the HSE*  
*we spoke*  
*about*  
*1/8*  
*I believe May I see*  
*see?*  
*SD*  
*5/8*



W. Boston to see.

Mr Clark



POSSIBLE KURDISH DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE  
IRAQI MINISTER OF HEALTH

- ⑧ attached.
1. Baghdad Tel No 270. As agreed and after speaking to PUSD I telephoned the Iraqi Embassy and told Miss Casparcora (the other members of the Embassy were out) of the information received from Baghdad and that we were asking the UK authorities to take appropriate action for Dr Mustafa's protection. She told me that the Minister would arrive by BA 801 from Beirut at 1550 hrs on 2 August and would stay for about a week at the Royal Garden Hotel. She undertook to inform the Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires as soon as possible of the steps we were taking.
  2. I then spoke, after checking with P and C Department, to Scotland Yard (Chief Superintendent Sinclair) who undertook to inform the police and ensure protection. I explained both the delicate political background and the need for protection to be visible to the Iraqis.

*P K Williams*

5 August 1974

P K Williams  
Middle East Department



GPS 30

10

CLAIR

TOP COPY

(NB)

FM FCO 051340Z

UNCLASSIFIED

TO ROUTINE BAGHDAD TELNO 183 OF 5 AUGUST 1974

YOUR TEL 270: DR IZZAT MUSTAFA



APPROPRIATE ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN AND THE IRAQI CHARGE D'AFFAIRES INFORMED.

CALLAGHAN

FILES

MED

SECURITY D

PUSD

M & VD

IRD

NEWS D

PS/MR ENNALS

MR WEIR

SIR G ARTHUR

SIR O WRIGHT






**British Embassy**  
Tehran

11

P K Williams Esq  
Middle East Dept  
FCO



Your reference

Our reference

Date 22 August 1974

Dear Father,

ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS

1. Thank you for your letter of 6 August about our representation in Baghdad. When I saw Parvizian at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs yesterday, I told him of Johnny Graham's appointment. He took note.

Yours sincerely  
NWB

N W Browne

Randpa  
27/8.




GR 1500

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 2611115Z

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TOP COPY

COPY ON  
NBR 22/1 VIBAS  
NBR 1/2 KURDS

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 345 OF 26 SEPTEMBER 1974.

INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN.

1. I WAS SUMMONED THIS MORNING BY THE UNDER SECRETARY WHO, SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS MINISTER, SAID HE WISHED TO EXPRESS AGAIN THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES 'DEEP CONCERN' AT WHAT APPEARED TO BE THE DECLINE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

2. JAMALI SAID THAT AS I KNEW, A NUMBER OF IRAQI PASSPORTS WERE NO LONGER VALID FOR THE UK. HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO SAY THAT THIS ACTION WAS BEING TAKEN FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS :-

(A) THE ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT OF IRAQI CITIZENS IN LONDON ON CHARGES OF SHOPLIFTING WHICH HAD BEEN 'ARRANGED' BY ZIONIST AGENTS. THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES HAD TAKEN NO ACTION TO PREVENT THIS HAPPENING.

(B) OUR CONTINUING POLICY OF MAKING DIFFICULTIES OVER VISAS FOR THE UK. DESPITE THE MINISTER'S PERSONAL REQUEST TO ME (MY TEL NO 325) WE HAD DELAYED ISSUING VISAS TO THREE MEMBERS OF THE STAFF WHO WERE URGENTLY NEEDED IN LONDON.

(C) BRITAIN WAS ADOPTING A POSITION MORE FAVOURABLE TO THE KURDISH DISSIDENTS THAN TO THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT. BRITISH OFFICIALS HAD RECEIVED KURDISH DISSIDENT REPRESENTATIVES IN LONDON, AND THE BRITISH PRESS WAS 'FULL OF' REPORTS CRITICAL OF IRAQ'S POLICY TOWARDS THE KURDS.

(D) WE WERE SUPPORTING IRAN IN THE MATTER OF THE BORDER AND KURDISH ISSUES. ON MOST MATTERS OUR POLICY WAS DISTINCTLY MORE FAVOURABLE TO IRAN THAN IRAQ.



3. HE WENT ON TO REPEAT MANY OF HIS EARLIER STATEMENTS ABOUT IRAQ ' ' ' DISAPPOINTMENT AT OUR FAILURE TO RESPOND TO THEIR DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS ( MY TEL NO 260 )<sup>NBR 22/1</sup>. THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES FOUND IT HARD TO UNDERSTAND WHY THIS SHOULD BE THE CASE AND HE THOUGHT THAT HM AMBASSADOR DESIGNATE WOULD HAVE A VERY DIFFICULT TIME UNLESS ACTIVE STEPS WERE TAKEN BY HMG TO IMPROVE MATTERS. THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEM, HE BELIEVED, WAS THAT OF VISAS. IF WE WOULD ONLY LIFT OUR RESTRICTIONS, THE IRAQIS WOULD BE VERY HAPPY TO FOLLOW SUIT , BUT UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THIS HAPPENED THEY WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO RETALIATE.

4. DEALING WITH HIS POINTS AS THEY HAD BEEN RAISED, I SAID THAT I WAS AWARE THAT TWO IRAQI SUBJECTS HAD BEEN CONVICTED BY LONDON COURTS FOR SHOPLIFTING. I HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE EVIDENCE PUT FORWARD IN THEIR DEFENCE, BUT WAS CERTAIN THAT PROPER WEIGHT WOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO IT BY THE JUDGES CONCERNED. HIS ALLEGATION THAT THE WHOLE THING HAD BEEN CONTRIVED BY ZIONIST AGENTS WAS ONE ON WHICH I COULD NOT COMMENT.

5. AS TO THE KURDS, I DENIED EMPHATICALLY THAT ANY KURDISH DISSIDENT HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY ANY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FCO ( YOUR TEL NO 179 )<sup>NBR 1/2</sup>. I REMINDED HIM THAT THERE WAS NO CONTROL OF THE PRESS IN BRITAIN. NEWSPAPERS WERE FREE TO SUPPORT ONE COURSE AGAINST ANOTHER. I REGRETTED THAT THE HADDAD DELEGATION HAD NOT MADE THE FULLEST USE OF ITS VISIT TO LONDON, — <sup>NBR 1/2</sup> ( WILLIAMS LETTER OF 3 SEPTEMBER TO ME ), I.E. AS FAR AS I WAS AWARE, NO REQUEST HAD BEEN MADE FOR THEM TO BE SEEN AT THE FCO, AND THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEIR INTERVIEWS WITH THE PRESS SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN INEFFICIENTLY HANDLED. I SAID

THAT IF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT OBJECTED TO BRITISH PRESS HANDLING OF THE KURDISH ISSUE, THEN THE FIRST STEP TO TAKE WAS TO ENSURE THAT ITS OWN POLICY WAS PROPERLY EXPLAINED . THIS DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN DONE. JAMALI TOOK NOTE OF THIS AND SAID HE WOULD REPORT TO THE MINISTER.

6. AS TO IRAN, I SAID THAT CERTAINLY OUR RELATIONS WERE EXCELLENT AND OF LONG STANDING BUT I WAS NOT AWARE THAT WE SUPPORTED IRAN TO THE DETRIMENT OF IRAQ. I SAW

/NO REASON



NO REASON WHY OUR RELATIONS WITH IRAQ SHOULD NOT BECOME CLOSE, BUT THESE THINGS TOOK TIME. AS TO HIS MAJOR CONCERN THAT WE WERE AIDING AND ABETTING THE IRANIANS IN THEIR SUPPORT OF THE KURDS, THIS WAS QUITE UNTRUE. AS I HAD ALREADY SAID, WE REGARDED THE KURDISH PROBLEM AS AN INTERNAL MATTER.

7. ON VISAS, I REPEATED WHAT I SAID EARLIER (MY TEL NO 260) THAT WE REGRETTED THAT CIRCUMSTANCES WERE SUCH THAT VISAS WERE NECESSARY, BUT UNFORTUNATELY I WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO SAY IF AND WHEN THIS POLICY WAS LIKELY TO BE CHANGED. FOR THE TIME BEING AT LEAST, VISAS WOULD CONTINUE TO BE NECESSARY. FOR OUR PART, WE WOULD DO OUR UTMOST TO SEE THAT THIS CAUSED THE MINIMUM OF DIFFICULTY TO TRAVELLERS. WE WERE ALREADY ISSUING VISAS FAR QUICKER THAN WERE THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES.

8. I SAID THAT I HOPED ALL THAT I HAD HAD TO SAY WOULD PERSUADE HIM THAT THERE WAS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR RESTRICTING TRAVEL TO THE U.K. SUCH RESTRICTIONS WERE OUTDATED AND SERVED NO PURPOSE. HE SAID ONLY THAT HE WOULD REPORT TO THE MINISTER.

9. JAMALI WAS SERIOUS WHEN HE COMPLAINED OF OUR ATTITUDE OVER VISAS AND THE DIFFICULTIES THIS WAS CAUSING IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF OUR RELATIONS. AS FOR THE REST, HE GAVE THE STRONG IMPRESSION THAT HE DID NOT AGREE WITH HIS MINISTER'S BRIEF, ON THE SHOPLIFTING CHARGES, IN PARTICULAR HE CLEARLY DID NOT REALLY BELIEVE WHAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SAY.

10. THERE IS NOT, I THINK, ANY NEED TO RESPOND TO ALL OF THESE CHARGES, BUT YOU MAY WISH ME TO SAY MORE ON THE MATTER OF PASSPORT VALIDITY. I WILL ENSURE THAT HM AMBASSADOR DESIGNATE IS FULLY BRIEFED ON THE MATERIAL ALREADY AVAILABLE HERE, THIS WILL, I THINK, SUFFICE. THE PROBLEM OF THE VISAS FOR MEMBERS OF THE STAFF OF THE IRAQI EMBASSY IS, HOWEVER MUCH MORE SERIOUS. PLEASE SEE MY MIPT.

GIDDENS

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PRIORITY

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30 SEP 1974

NBR 3/548/4

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1974

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 243 OF 27 SEPTEMBER/1974  
TEHRAN.

YOUR TELS NOS 345 AND 346 — NBR 1/2

1. YOU SPOKE WELL.

2. MY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WILL MEET TAQA AT THE AIRPORT AND, SUBJECT TO HIS OTHER COMMITMENTS, WE HOPE THAT MR ENNALS WILL BE ABLE TO CALL ON TAQA BEFORE THE LATTER LEAVES FOR NEW YORK. THE MINISTER OF STATE WILL BE BRIEFED TO ANSWER THE ACCUSATIONS THE IRAQIS HAVE MADE ABOUT THE KURDISH AND VISA ISSUES ALONG THE LINES YOU HAVE ALREADY ADOPTED.

3. WE SHOULD NOT WISH TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARRANGING A PRESS CONFERENCE FOR TAQA TO AIR IRAQI POLICY TOWARDS THE KURDISH PROBLEM. PRESS COMMENT MAY WELL BE HOSTILE. IN ANY CASE, IT IS ENTIRELY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE EMBASSY CONCERNED TO ARRANGE SUCH CONFERENCES. WE HAVE HOWEVER WARNED THE IRAQI EMBASSY THAT TAQA MAY WISH TO HOLD A CONFERENCE OF THIS TYPE DURING HIS STAY AND THEY ARE SEEKING INSTRUCTIONS FROM BAGHDAD. IF YOU SEE ADVANTAGE IN SO DOING, YOU MAY INFORM THE IRAQIS OF OUR ACTION.

4. ON THE QUESTION OF VISAS, YOU WILL NO DOUBT HAVE CORRECTLY INTERPRETED OUR FAILURE TO REPLY TO YOUR TEL NO 344 AS APPROVAL TO ISSUE THE THREE OUTSTANDING VISAS AS PROPOSED.

CALLAGHAN

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
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TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD TELNO 244 OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1974

MYTEL 243: <sup>(13)</sup> VISIT OF IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER

1. WE DO NOT HAVE A PERSONALITY REPORT ON SHADHIL TAQA.  
WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR A TELEGRAPHIC ASSESSMENT, INCLUDING AN  
INDICATION OF HIS PROFICIENCY IN ENGLISH, WITH WHICH TO BRIEF MR EN  
ENNALS.

CALLAGHAN

FILES

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MR WEIR

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FM BAGHDAD 011030Z OCT.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

DESKBY 011200Z OCT.

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 350 OF 1 OCTOBER 1974.

14.  
YOUR TEL NO 244 : VISIT OF IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER: SHADHIL  
JASSIM TAQA.

1. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF IRAQI NEWS AGENCY AND UNDER  
SECRETARY AT MINISTRY OF CULTURE UNDER AREF 1. IRAQI  
AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW 1969/71, UNDER SECRETARY OF  
STATE, MFA, 1971 TO 23 JUNE 1974. APPOINTED MINISTER  
24 JUNE. A CONFIRMED MEMBER OF THE BA'ATH PARTY,  
WHOSE INFLUENCE APPEARS TO BE GROWING, THOUGH IT  
CANNOT BE SAID TO BE PARTICULARLY GREAT. PROBABLY  
CLOSER TO THE PRESIDENT THAN HE IS TO SADDAM HUSSEIN.  
A LIVELY AND AMUSING MAN. HAS REASONABLE ENGLISH BUT  
FREQUENTLY PREFERS TO USE AN INTERPRETER.


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Mr Curle [for Sir D Scott-Fox] 1974

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## VISIT OF THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER

1. His Excellency Mr Shadhil Jasim Taqa, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, is due to arrive at Heathrow on Algerian Airlines flight AH 210 at 18.10 hrs tomorrow, 1 October. The Brabazon VIP Lounge has been reserved for him. It is not clear at this stage how long Mr Taqa will be staying. He is transiting London en route to the United Nations in New York.

2. Diplomatic relations with Iraq were resumed on 10 April this year following negotiations between Mr Taqa and Sir Donald Maitland. The Iraqis had broken relations in December 1971 because of our alleged collusion with the Iranians over the seizure of the Tunbs Islands in the Persian Gulf. Since the resumption, our relations with the Iraqis have been correct rather than warm.

3. Since the settlement of their dispute with the Iraq Petroleum Company and the general rise in oil prices, the Iraqi economy has made a substantial recovery from its former stagnation. It is possible that Iraq is now second only to Saudi Arabia in the Middle East in terms of oil reserves and consequently presents a very attractive market to us. Our exports to Iraq for the first seven months of this year are, at £27.4 million, approximately 70% up on the corresponding 1973 figure.

4. The Iraqis continually complain about our system of referring all Iraqi visa applications to London. There are good security reasons for this and no immediate prospect of the system being revised. Recently, the Iraqis have also accused us of being sympathetic to the Kurds with whom they are currently engaged in a civil war.

  
P R H Wright

Middle East Department


30 September 1974



*Mr. Burt 1/8/74 pa  
pu + pa*

Mr Wright

Mr Weir



*[Signature]*  
*3x*

CALL ON IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER AT 11.45 AM ON 3 OCTOBER

A 1. Mr Shadhil Taqa is leaving for New York early on Friday morning and it has not been possible to arrange a meeting between him and Mr Ennals. You will wish to say how sorry the latter is about this. Taqa is travelling to New York where he is due to speak at the UN on 7 October. Baghdad tel no 350 giving a brief curriculum vitae of Taqa is at Flag A.

B 2. On 26 September, HM Chargé in Baghdad was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be told about the "deep concern" the Iraqi authorities felt at the apparent decline in relations between our two countries. The major complaints were, as usual, our visa policy and our alleged pro-Kurdish attitude.

3. Visas. For security reasons connected originally with Iraqi assassination plots in the UK, but justified additionally by Iraqi involvement and support for Palestinian terrorist activities, all Iraqi visa applications are sent to London for security checking. Security checking is based on photographs and full details given in application forms and is not merely a name-check against records. In the last two years about 40 individuals have been identified through this system as serious security risks. Although in the same period many thousands of visas have been approved the percentage of security identifications have been relatively high. In most cases visas are issued in Baghdad about 10 days after applications have been lodged. An increasing number of visas are now being granted immediately and the system is kept under review so as to reduce to the minimum any inconvenience to the bona fide traveller.

4. On the eve of the Foreign Minister's visit, a number of applications for new staff for the Iraqi Embassy were under consideration here. Visas for those going for postings or extended stays could not be processed as quickly as short-term visitors, particularly as we have been required to frustrate Iraqi attempts to reinstall their West European intelligence centre in their Embassy here.

/The



The Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs made representations to Mr Giddens that these outstanding visas should be granted in time for their Foreign Minister's visit to ensure that their Embassy was adequately staffed for his arrival. All outstanding applications were cleared by 27 September. The earliest were received in London on 6 September and the last was received on 23 September.

Line to Take

5. We regret the need to operate a visa reference system and do our utmost to minimise delays. It would be helpful if the Iraqi authorities concerned with the official sponsored travel could do their best to see that their applications are lodged with our Embassy in Baghdad in good time. We trust British applications for Iraqi visas will be equally speedily processed.

C 6. Kurds. The Iraqis have complained before about the activities of so-called Kurdish dissidents in London. We have taken the standard line that the political views of foreign visitors to this country are only relevant if they were to engage in unlawful or unconstitutional activities. We refused earlier this year to receive two representatives of the Kurdish movement because of our diplomatic relations with the central Government. The Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs had asked us if we would help to arrange a press conference at which Mr Taqa could air Iraqi policy towards the Kurdish problem. We declined to do this and I have since learned that the Iraqi Embassy have advised against the holding of such a conference.

D 7. Oil Prices: Meeting of Foreign and Finance Ministers. It is possible that Mr Taqa may mention the Kissinger/Ford speeches on confrontation. You will wish to keep to the line to take in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the guidance telegram on the meeting of Foreign and Finance Ministers. A copy of the Secretary of State's speech at the UN is attached at Flag F.

E 8. Embassy Buildings. Earlier this year, the Iraqis informed us of their intention to purchase the freehold of their premises at 15 Kensington Palace Gardens. This is Crown property and the Crown Commissioners will not agree to the sale of such property in London. This decision, which is final, was conveyed in our note of 30 August.

H 9. Trade. Our exports to Iraq for the first seven months of this year are, at £27.4 million, about 70% up on the corresponding period last year. There will shortly be

/another




another COMET trade mission to Iraq. The Iraqis have not yet replied to our proposals in the draft Memorandum of Understanding left with them on 27 July. We have no wish to raise this, but if Mr Taqa complains at our lack of effort to improve relations, you may care to point out (defensively) our speedy efforts to prepare these proposals and the Iraqi tardiness in replying.



G S Buxton  
Middle East Department

2 October 1974





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Mr Williams to see  
OK

RECORD OF A CALL BY MR WEIR ON THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER  
AT THE ROYAL GARDEN HOTEL AT 11.45 AM ON THURSDAY,  
3 OCTOBER 1974

Present:

HE Mr Shadhil Taqa

Mr M S Weir

Mr Abdul Munim Zebaidi  
(Private Secretary to  
the Minister)

Mr P R H Wright

1. After courtesies, Mr Weir conveyed the Secretary of State's respects and said that both Mr Callaghan and Mr Ennals were disappointed that there was no opportunity for them to meet the Minister on this occasion. Mr Ennals had hoped to see Mr Taqa on 4 October, but Mr Weir understood that the Minister's departure time made this impossible.

2. Mr Weir expressed HMG's pleasure at the resumption of diplomatic relations with Iraq and warmly commended Mr Graham, who was an old personal friend and who had long experience both of the Arab world and of Whitehall. Mr Taqa said that he looked forward to welcoming Mr Graham in Baghdad and he believed that he was due to arrive there within a few days. He felt bound to say however that Mr Graham was likely to find a mountain of problems on his arrival. Mr Weir said that he was sorry to hear this but invited the Minister to explain what these problems were.

Visas

3. Recalling the representations made mostly by the Iraqi Foreign Ministry to HM Chargé d'Affaires, Mr Taqa said that there had been a number of problems connected with visas for Iraqi visitors to Britain. He presumed that our reason for delaying or refusing certain visas, eg for members of the Iraqi Embassy in London, were because the applicants were known to be members of the Baath Party.

/He



He would make no secret of the fact that he had deliberately chosen Baathists to staff his Embassy here and it was surely in the interest of both our Governments that this should be so. What was the use of diplomats if they did not represent their Governments' views? The British Government had often in his experience arranged for members of the governing party to represent them in Embassies abroad. After Mr Weir had explained that this was in fact a very rare occurrence in our case Mr Taqa acknowledged that the comparison might not be a fair one. He maintained his view however that it was in our mutual interest to ensure that the Iraqi Embassy here were in touch with their Government's thinking. In the days before the Iraqi revolution we would surely have preferred Iraqi diplomats to be in sympathy with Nuri al Said rather than in opposition to him? Mr Taqa assured Mr Weir that none of their diplomats in London were spies. He added that Mr Graham and all the diplomatic members of our Embassy in Baghdad appeared to be graduates of the famous school at Shemlan. (Mr Weir commented that he was also.) Mr Taqa said that there were wide-spread suspicions about Shemlan in Baghdad and even if the Government did not believe these they were widely held by Iraqis. The Iraqi Government had nevertheless not used this as a reason for refusing visas to our diplomats.

4. Referring to specific cases, Mr Taqa said that we had refused two visas for Iraqi diplomats whom he had wished to transfer from Beirut and Paris respectively. The first, Mr Kahtan Shakir, was the brother of the Head of the Iraqi Intelligence Service and he presumed that this relationship was the reason for our refusal. In the second case, Mr Temimi had been refused a visa in spite of the Minister's personal assurance that Temimi was suffering from terminal cancer and needed urgent medical treatment here which he could best receive by attachment to the Embassy. In spite of repeated appeals we had done no more than grant Temimi a one-week visitor's visa.

5. Mr Taqa went on to refer to the case of 5 diplomats whom the Iraqi Government had decided to appoint to London nearly two months' ago. Visas for most of them had still not been issued on the day of his departure from Baghdad. Mr Weir said that his understanding was that the maximum delay in the case of these visas was no more than 19 days and the minimum had been as little as 4 days; authority for all the visas had in fact been given. Mr Taqa said that this might be so, but that it had only happened after strong representations by his Under-Secretary to Mr Giddens. In any case, it was surely very unusual for a Government to refuse a visa to a visiting diplomat. It was a sending Government's right to choose whoever they wished to represent them abroad. Mr Weir contested this and pointed out that we had ourselves known cases where our diplomats had been refused visas or had had to wait a long time for visas to be granted.



6. Mr Taqa said that there was one other visa case which he wished to mention. A very senior member of the Iraq Government, Mr Hassam al Ameri, had been refused a visa to visit London even though he had been told by our Embassy in Baghdad that he would be able to collect his visa from the British Embassy in Bonn. Mr Wright said that he wished to express regrets for this case and assured the Minister that if Mr Ameri wished to visit London in the future there should be no difficulty over a visa. Mr Taqa said that he was glad to hear this, but a refusal once given inevitably left a psychological scar.

7. Mr Weir said that there were certain indispensable processes that all visa applications had to go through and that this inevitably took time. But we would certainly do everything possible to speed up our visa procedures and hoped that the Iraqis would do likewise. The Minister would also realise that the numbers involved presented considerable bureaucratic problems, particularly in the summer months. Mr Taqa said that he realised this; indeed, his information indicated that about 12,000 Iraqis had visited London this summer.

#### Kurds

8. Mr Taqa said that, we we knew, the Iraqi Government were having their difficulties with the outlaw, Barazani. We had nevertheless allowed two of Barazani's followers, called Dezaii and Mahmud, to establish themselves in London and to put out publicity material hostile to the Iraqi Government. They were also given access to Members of Parliament and to the press and he had now received a report that the Kurdish students in London were to hold a meeting at the Imperial College on the following day, 4 October. Mr Weir reminded the Minister that this was a free democratic society in which we had no power to prevent people expressing their views, provided they did so within the law. Furthermore, there had been no contact between the two Kurds, whom the Minister had mentioned, and HMG. Mr Wright added that we had in fact received a request from the two Kurds in question to be received at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, but refused this request. Mr Taqa said that he was most interested to hear this very significant piece of information and asked when this had happened. Mr Wright said that we had reported it to our Embassy in Baghdad about a month ago and had authorised them to tell the Iraqi Foreign Ministry; his impression was that this had been done. Mr Taqa said that such an important piece of information would certainly have come to his notice. In reply to a question, Mr Zebaidi confirmed that he had not heard of this before. Mr Taqa recalled that there had been an incident in 1966 when an Iraqi Government official, Mr Ali Saleh al-Saadi, had been

/refused



refused a visa to visit Britain in order to explain the Iraqi Government case. In response to a remark by Mr Weir, Mr Taqa agreed that this was old history and that we should look to the future.

### Shop-lifting

9. Mr Taqa said that there was another incident which he wished to raise. An Iraqi woman had been arrested some time ago for stealing something of very little value from a London store. She was almost certainly suffering from a not uncommon psychological ailment which, for some curious reason, compelled people to steal worthless items even after they had paid for hundreds of pounds-worth of goods. He did not for one moment contest our right to arrest or punish such people and he hoped that any Iraqis caught stealing in this way in the future would be suitably dealt with. What he did object to was the anti-Iraqi publicity which had surrounded this case and which, both in the press and on television, had set out to portray all Iraqis as thieves. Mr Weir said that he did not know of this particular case but he was very surprised to hear that it had received publicity on television, since there were frequent cases of shop-lifting in London reported in the press every day. This was not of course a problem confined to Iraqis. He had only recently seen a letter to "The Times" about a shop-lifting charge against an Iranian lady and there were frequent cases of this sort involving visitors from all over the world. If the Minister had received the impression that the press had shown particular interest in an Iraqi case this was perhaps the natural result of a report by his Embassy here which would not have concerned itself with similar cases from other countries. Mr Taqa said that he was nevertheless most concerned by the unfriendly impression which the press had given. There was an Arab saying that a Bedouin would give away his clothes in return for a noble word. Conversely, the Arabs responded to insults and it was as a direct result of the case he had mentioned that he had given instructions that Iraqi passports would in future be invalid for visits to Britain except in the case of students, government officials and medical cases.

### Relations with Iran

10. Mr Taqa said that the Iraqi Government were bound to contrast HMG's relations with Iraq with their relations with Iran. He wished in particular to mention the dispute over the 1937 Agreement on the Shatt al Arab. The Iranians claimed that the Iraqi side of this Agreement had been the result of Imperialist pressure from Britain and attacked the Iraqis on this score; it would surely be more logical for them to attack us.

/11.



11. Nevertheless he was anxious to reach agreement with the Iranians on the border dispute and he proposed to have talks with the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mr Khalatbari, when he saw him in New York within the next few days. In reply to Mr Weir's comment that the handling of the recent reference of the problem to the UN was a good augury, Mr Taqa said that he had been most appreciative of the stand taken by the British delegation at the UN during the Security Council discussion. He added, with a laugh, that this was something positive on the balance sheet.

### Economic Relations

12. Mr Taqa recalled his discussions with Sir Donald Maitland earlier this year at which Sir Donald had expressed the intention of ensuring a speedy follow-up to his visit by some type of economic agreement. Months of delay had followed and the Iraqis had only received from us a month or so ago a draft Memorandum of Understanding. He asked sarcastically whether there had been heavy snow in London this summer which might have delayed our presentation of the Draft? Mr Weir said that he recalled that the Memorandum had in fact been presented some time earlier than the Minister had suggested and there was certainly no hesitation on our part in pursuing economic cooperation with the Iraqi Government. Indeed we hoped that British commercial firms would take a much more active part in Iraq.

13. Mr Taqa welcomed this and recalled sadly that Britain no longer held the first place as she had previously in the league of exporters to Iraq. At a press conference which he had held on the previous day he had been asked about Iraq's agreement with Japan and he had explained that the Iraq Government were ready to cooperate economically with any country who wished. Britain however knew the Arabs well and there was less excuse for us than for say the Russians if we did not understand how to do business with the Arabs. Although the Iraqis were deeply suspicious of the Americans (he quoted an Arab proverb about snakes and peppermint) they had nevertheless given an American company the contract for the deep-water terminal at Umm Qasr, since the American tender had in all respects been the most attractive.

### Energy

14. Mr Taqa referred to the recent speeches by President Ford and Dr Kissinger about the energy crisis. He thought that it was most unfortunate that the Americans should be uttering veiled threats in this way towards the Arabs. It was clear to him that although President Ford's speech explicitly referred to the oil producers he was in fact aiming it at the Arabs rather than Iran or Nigeria. In his view however the crisis had for long been one of cheap oil. The American

/oil



oil companies were making up to 50% profits and in his view the American speeches had been designed to harm not only the Arabs but also Europe. He understood that Dr Kissinger made little secret in private of his dislike for England, which he appeared to have acquired from his reading of Metternich. Mr Weir said that he had in fact been present at a very cordial meeting with Dr Kissinger only a week before, but did not think that Dr Kissinger based his policies on likes or dislikes. He pointed out that Mr Callaghan's speech at the UN had made it very clear that we wished to work in cooperation with the producers. Mr Taqa acknowledged this and said that Britain had played a leading part in getting the Euro/Arab Dialogue going.

Defence: Anglo/Iraqi Relations and Defence Equipment

15. Mr Taqa said that he hoped that we could now put all these difficulties behind us and reach a "gentlemen's agreement" to avoid such problems in future. Mr Weir welcomed this and hoped that the Minister would accept that our relations were bound to start gradually after a two-years' break. Mr Taqa agreed and expressed the view that the Iraqi Government had made a bad mistake in responding to popular emotion at the time by breaking off relations with HMG in 1971. The question over which they had broken [ie the Islands question] had been a matter of great importance to Iraq but they might have been wrong in suggesting that HMG were directly responsible. If they had made a mistake it had certainly cost them a lot. They had in any case decided to resume relations at no cost and had not asked for anything in return from us. He hoped that we could now move ahead together in our mutual interest to meet Iraqi needs, both for development and for defence against aggression. Mr Weir said that we would certainly do everything possible to move forward over the whole field of our bilateral relations and said that he had no doubt that Mr Graham would be pursuing all aspects energetically after his arrival in Baghdad. Mr Taqa said that on the question of defence there was one particular question which he wished to raise. The Iraqis had asked some time ago for the supply of a mortar-locating radar system with Cymbeline, but they had heard no reply since then. Mr Weir said that agreement had been given in principle to the supply of Cymbeline although he did not know when it would in fact be available. Mr Taqa said that he was delighted to hear this and would like to telegraph President Bakr immediately to inform him that HMG had agreed to the supply of Cymbeline. Mr Wright emphasised that although HMG had given agreement in principle, delivery might well be delayed although this was of course a matter for discussion between the manufacturers, EMI, and the Iraqi Ministry of Defence. Mr Taqa said that HMG could certainly use their influence to speed up delivery and he hoped that Mr Wright would be able to give him a clear indication of the delivery position before his departure for New York on the following day.

/Arab/Israel



Arab/Israel

16. In conclusion, Mr Taqa said that he wished to mention the Arab/Israel question briefly. It was his impression that although the British Government's position on the Arab/Israel dispute was better than it had been three years' ago there had been some signs of increasing sympathy towards Israel during the past year. Surely it was more in Britain's interest to pay attention to 80 million Arabs than to 2 million Israelis. Mr Weir said that Britain's main interest lay in a settlement of the problem, and that we attached great importance to our relations with the Arab States.

## DISTRIBUTION

Private Secretary  
PS/Mr Ennals  
PS/PUS  
Mr Campbell  
Mr Weir  
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NENAD  
TRED  
Energy Dept  
Defence Dept

Sir D Maitland  
Mr Peter Scott

Chanceries: Baghdad  
Tehran



Mr Burton

IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER

1. As you know, the delay in the Iraqi Foreign Minister's departure for New York yesterday resulted in my having about two and a half hour's conversation with him at London Airport. The following points may be worth recording.

2. Mr Taqa said that he had found his talk on the previous day with Mr Weir very useful. He was sure that it was better for us to discuss our problems openly and frankly, and in a spirit of goodwill. He looked forward to many such talks in the future. I said that Mr Graham would certainly look forward to meeting the Minister very soon after his return to Baghdad, and asked when that was likely to be. He replied that this depended on when Mr Khalatbari arrived in New York (he clearly attaches importance to meeting him there), but his first action on returning home would be to invite Mr Graham to call.

3. I asked whether he knew Mr Khalatbari well. He said that he had only once met him, in 1967. He quite liked him. But the trouble with Iran was that the Shah was his own Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Chief of Staff; all the others were no more than pawns on the chess-board. (At this point, he digressed to point out to me, with a chuckle, that the Russian for chess meant "The Shah is dead"!).

4. Mr Taqa introduced me to the Editor of Al Thawra ( a member of the Regional Baath) who was travelling with him, and who evidently acts as his Public Relations Adviser. The latter asked whether we could do anything to help improve the standard of British press reporting on Iraq. At present, such stories as there were were usually based on fanciful suq gossip picked up in the cafes of Beirut. I said that this was a familiar problem which I remembered well from my days in Cairo; in that case, the problem had partly arisen from the lack of facilities given then to foreign journalists by the Egyptians - if they were not allowed to file their stories without censorship from Cairo, most of them preferred to sit in the greater comfort of Beirut and file their stories from there.

5. Mr Taqa said that they hoped to remedy the situation by inviting occasional British journalists to Baghdad. He had already invited a representative of the Financial Times to visit Baghdad, and he had already left. He added, rather obscurely, that the journalist concerned "looked like a Kurd", but he hoped the visit would be useful. (I have since seen News Department's telegram No 248 of 3 October).

6. Mr Taqa asked whether I had seen accounts of his press conference. I said that I had, and that I was glad that he had taken advantage of his stay here to put across his

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/ Governments

*Handwritten notes:*  
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732. *Mr Khalatbari*  
733. *Mr Weir*  
734. *Mr Graham*  
735. *Mr Khalatbari*  
736. *Mr Weir*  
737. *Mr Graham*  
738. *Mr Khalatbari*  
739. *Mr Weir*  
740. *Mr Graham*  
741. *Mr Khalatbari*  
742. *Mr Weir*  
743. *Mr Graham*  
744. *Mr Khalatbari*  
745. *Mr Weir*  
746. *Mr Graham*  
747. *Mr Khalatbari*  
748. *Mr Weir*  
749. *Mr Graham*  
750. *Mr Khalatbari*  
751. *Mr Weir*  
7



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12. Apart from a lot of familiar conversation about the Arabic language and polite gossip, the only other point of interest is that the Minister engaged in a long conversation with the Embassy staff present about their accommodation. I was not able to follow the detail (indeed, I heard the Minister refuse a request by Mr Khalil that he should raise with me the question of the purchase of their Crown Property), but it ended with the Minister writing out in manuscript an authorisation for the Embassy to go ahead with the purchase of some property in Bayswater, overlooking Hyde Park. I gathered that they were anxious to obtain ownership of four adjoining houses (some of which they already own), in order to site all their Embassy offices (or staff accommodation?) together.

5 October 1974



P R H Wright  
Middle East Department

Copies: Mr Weir ✓  
News Department (paras 4-8)  
Chancery, Baghdad.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1

Telephone 01-

(20)

J Myall Esq  
CRE4  
Department of Trade

Your reference

Our reference

Date 8 October 1974



As you know, Mr Shadhil Taqa, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, visited London last week. You may be interested to see the enclosed extract of the record of a conversation between Taqa and Michael Weir on 3 October covering Anglo-Iraqi economic relations.

see (18)

G S Burton  
Middle East Department

Enc



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(21)


*Det*

*I am afraid that Mr. Ennals did not have time to read this today.*

*A.S. Wla 4/10.*

Mr Weir

*McGlen.*



*B.U. 15/10.*

CALL ON THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER

1. I attach a draft record of your call on the Iraqi Foreign Minister this morning. I apologise for its length but I think that the conversation is worth reporting fairly fully, particularly since our contacts with the Iraqi Government have been so few in recent years.

2. On reading the draft I am conscious of having presented it very much as a monologue by the Iraqi Foreign Minister. In considering the draft, would you please pay particular attention to any points which you recall making and which you would like included (eg in the final paragraph).

3. Since the bag to Baghdad closes at 4.30 pm today I am sending Mr Giddens an advance copy of the enclosure.

*P R H Wright*  
P R H Wright  
Middle East Department

3 October 1974

*4/x*

*Recd to issue, please, with copies to :  
B. 7/10*

Private Secretary

PS/Mr. Ennals

PS/P.V.S.

Mr. Campbell

Mr. Weir

MEB (to mtr)

MVD

PUSD

+ Chancery:

NEVAD

Baghdad

TRED

Tehran

Energy Dept

Per D. Hartland

Defence Dept

MR. Peter Scott

*then to Mr. Butler as Dpts D.O. 15/10  
to inform Dept. of Trade  
4 S 12 + 13 ?*

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CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 121030Z OCT

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 14 OCT 1974 NBR 3/548/4
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TOP COPY

(22)

1974

TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 367 OF 12 OCTOBER SAVING TO BEIRUT KUWAIT  
AMMAN DAMASCUS CAIRO AND WASHINGTON.

ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS.

WHEN I PRESENTED MY LETTERS OF CREDENCE TO THE PRESIDENT TODAY HE SPOKE OF HIS DESIRE FOR A "NEW CHAPTER" IN OUR RELATIONS. HE STRESSED THAT IRAQ HAD MADE THE MOVE FOR A RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS FROM CONSIDERATIONS OF INTEREST (WHICH HE UNDERSTOOD WERE WHAT GUIDED BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY). IRAQ HAD REACHED A POINT OF VEXATION WITH BRITAIN OVER THE LATTER'S GULF POLICY WHICH HAD NECESSITATED THE RUPTURE (I MADE A SUITABLE RESPONSE), BUT THAT WAS THE PAST. IT WAS THE DUTY OF DIPLOMATS TO WORK TO PREVENT SUCH DIFFICULTIES ARISING.

2. I SAID THAT IT WAS CERTAINLY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S WISH TO OPEN A NEW CHAPTER AND TO PUT THE PAST BEHIND US. I HOPED THAT IF MISUNDERSTANDINGS AROSE WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO TALK THEM OVER WITH CANDOUR AND FRIENDSHIP.

3. THE PRESIDENT LOOKED FRAIL AND SPOKE VERY QUIETLY, ALMOST AS IT WERE A MATTER OF DIFFICULTY. HE WAS QUITE CLEAR IN HIS MIND AND QUICK TO MAKE AND SEE A JOKE.

GRAHAM

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NEWS DEPT

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CONFIDENTIAL

Reference.....

(23)

Mr Burton

IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No 35

16 OCT 1974

NBR 3/548/4

1. As you know, the delay in the Iraqi Foreign Minister's departure for New York yesterday resulted in my having about two and a half hour's conversation with him at London Airport. The following points may be worth recording.

2. Mr Taqa said that he had found his talk on the previous day with Mr Weir very useful. He was sure that it was better for us to discuss our problems openly and frankly, and in a spirit of goodwill. He looked forward to many such talks in the future. I said that Mr Graham would certainly look forward to meeting the Minister very soon after his return to Baghdad, and asked when that was likely to be. He replied that this depended on when Mr Khalatbari arrived in New York (he clearly attaches importance to meeting him there), but his first action on returning home would be to invite Mr Graham to call.

3. I asked whether he knew Mr Khalatbari well. He said that he had only once met him, in 1967. He quite liked him. But the trouble with Iran was that the Shah was his own Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Chief of Staff; all the others were no more than pawns on the chess-board. (At this point, he digressed to point out to me, with a chuckle, that the Russian for chess meant "The Shah is dead"!).

4. Mr Taqa introduced me to the Editor of Al Tgawra (a member of the Regional Baath) who was travelling with him, and who evidently acts as his Public Relations Adviser. The latter asked whether we could do anything to help improve the standard of British press reporting on Iraq. At present, such stories as there were were usually based on fanciful sug gossip picked up in the cafes of Beirut. I said that this was a familiar problem which I remembered well from my days in Cairo; in that case, the problem had partly arisen from the lack of facilities given then to foreign journalists by the Egyptians - if they were not allowed to file their stories without censorship from Cairo, most of them preferred to sit in the greater comfort of Beirut and file their stories from there.

5. Mr Taqa said that they hoped to remedy the situation by inviting occasional British journalists to Baghdad. He had already invited a representative of the Financial Times to visit Baghdad, and he had already left. He added, rather obscurely, that the journalist concerned "looked like a Kurd", but he hoped the visit would be useful. (I have since seen News Department's telegram No 248 of 3 October).

6. Mr Taqa asked whether I had seen accounts of his press conference. I said that I had, and that I was glad that he had taken advantage of his stay here to put across his

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/ Governments



Government's views to the British press. He said that many of the questions had been insistent, not to say hostile, but that his replies had been fully and objectively reported. The BBC had asked for an official transcript, but they had been told that the Reuter's version was reliable and accurate; he did not know whether the BBC had made use of it.

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5 October 1974



P R H Wright  
Middle East Department

Copies: Mr Weir  
News Department (paras 4-8)  
Chancery, Baghdad.

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WONF085/11

NYWON 27/11

OU FCO

GR 130

DESKBY 120830Z

EN CLAIR

FM BVO NEW YORK 112125Z

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 120830Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO VISA 434 OF 11/10/74  
FOR RESIDENT CLERK

PLEASE ADVISE M E D DUTY OFFICER THAT H.E. MR SHADEL J TAQA  
IRAQI MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ACCOMPANIED BY THE SIX OFFICIALS  
LISTED IN OUR VISA TELS 426 AND 432 WILL NOT (NOT) NOW BE  
TRAVELLING TO THE UK ON 12 OCTOBER. PARTY NOW HOPE TO TRAVEL  
ON 15 OR 16 OCTOBER AND IRAQI MISSION HAVE PROMISED TO GIVE  
FLIGHT DETAILS WHICH WE WILL FORWARD. IRAQI MISSION ALSO ADVISE  
US THAT STAY WILL PROBABLY BE OF TWO OR THREE DAYS ONLY RATHER  
THAN EARLIER QUOTED WEEK OR TEN DAYS. VISIT IS DESCRIBED AS A  
STOPOVER AT IRAQI EMBASSY.

FORD

NNNN

TPD NY 11/2130Z MSJ

IMMEDIATE

DESKBY 120830Z  
ADVANCE COPY

Hd MED  
Hd MVD

R/C

[FAMES]

2X

Now coming Friday  
18/10/74  
Mr. Buxton 1<sup>st</sup>

IN N335 16 OCT 1974 NBR 3/548/4
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CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 80

CYPHER/CAT A

FM FCO 181800Z



CONFIDENTIAL

TO ROUTINE BAGHDAD TELNO 262 OF 18 OCTOBER 1974  
TAQA'S VISIT

1. HAVING HEARD THAT TAQA WOULD BE STAYING IN LONDON FOR A FEW DAYS FROM 15 OCTOBER ON HIS RETURN FROM THE UN I AGREED TO RECEIVE HIM FOR TALKS ON 17 OCTOBER AND TAQA WAS INFORMED ACCORDINGLY IN NEW YORK. IN THE EVENT, HE WAS UNABLE TO TRAVEL UNTIL 18 OCTOBER, WHEN I WAS NOT FREE TO SEE HIM, AND HE LEAVES FOR BAGHDAD ON 19 OCTOBER.

2. ALTHOUGH NO MEETING WAS ACHIEVED, TAQA WAS EVIDENTLY PLEASED WITH THE GESTURE.

CALLAGHAN

FILES

MED

PS

PS TO MR ENNALS

MR WEIR

CONFIDENTIAL



TRANSLATION

No. 4/31/242/38545

2/2

Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
International Organisations  
and Conferences Department

Baghdad, 29 September 1974

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs present their compliments to the Diplomatic Missions accredited to Baghdad and have the honour to inform them that the Iraqi National Committee for UNESCO, at its meeting held on the 24th August 1974, made a recommendation requesting the friendly States which sympathize with movements of liberation, hold to the Charter of the United Nations and believe in World's Declaration of Human Rights, to carry out their international responsibilities in the light of the several decisions of the General Assembly of the U.N., the Security Council and the Committee for Human Rights convicting the Zionist aggression and denouncing the Zionist Movements for its being a racial movement, condemning their works of sabotage and falsification of historical national and religious facts. The Iraqi National Committee for UNESCO, in sending out this call, request the esteemed Embassy to mediate with their Government to advise their delegation to the eighteenth session of the UNESCO General Conference which is to be held in Paris during next October to stand by the Arab rights by supporting the draft decision which is intended to be prepared for the condemnation of Israel and uncovering its aggression against the Palestinian people who never stopped struggling for their liberty to practise their right of self determination of fate and preserve their entity in compliance with the decisions of the United Nations and its various institutions.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq hope that the proposal in question of the Iraqi National Committee for UNESCO will receive the due attention and care of the esteemed Embassy and their Government, and await the result of their efforts in this respect.

The Ministry avail themselves of this opportunity to express their highest consideration and esteem.

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy.  
Baghdad.



UNCLASSIFIED

(27)



BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

2/2

13 October 1974

Middle East Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
LONDON

*Copy + enc - UN Doc 22-24  
BB 22/1\**

Dear Department

UNESCO

1. We enclose a translated version of a Note received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seeking HMG's support for a draft Resolution to be tabled at the 18th Session of UNESCO.
2. We have acknowledged receipt of the Note.

Yours ever

Chancery

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 2 20CT 1974 NBR 3/548/4
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
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3/3

P R H Wright Esq  
Middle East Department  
F C 10



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BRITISH EMBASSY  
BAGHDAD

14 October 1974

28

*L. Cleary 21/10*  
*L. Linton 22/X*  
*L. Burdett 22/X*

Dear Patrice,

1. As you will know from my telegram No. 367, I presented my Letters of Credence on Saturday 12 October. I was originally given a date for the Thursday, which I gather would have been by any count extremely swift, but it was postponed.
2. In view of the rumours we were all naturally watching to see how the President looked. He had quite a high colour and appeared somewhat puffy in the face, with bloodshot eyes, but what struck me was the quietness of his voice, and, as I said in my telegram, almost the appearance of having difficulty in speaking. However, I am told that he is always quietly spoken and it would really be impossible to draw any firm conclusions. Nevertheless it is fairly generally acknowledged here, particularly in medical circles, that he has been seen by specialists.
3. After the formal ceremony we had about 20 to 25 minutes conversation. It started off awkwardly, partly I think because there were photographers, but once they had withdrawn it warmed up somewhat. I summarised the drift of what the President said in my telegram: unlike Shadhil Taqa when he saw you and Michael Weir in London, Al Bakr did not express any doubts about the wisdom of breaking off relations with us in 1971 but rather attributed the breach to an accumulation of causes of anger, of which the Islands were the last straw. Nevertheless the whole thrust of his argument was that we should open a new chapter and let the past be the past and it seemed to me, although I did make the point that our withdrawal had presented us with a problem in that it was probably impossible to achieve without some painful consequences, that I could whole-heartedly agree with this.
4. The only other point of slight interest was the comparison the President drew between British and French policy. In Syria during the time of the French mandate he said that the French had ruled with an iron hand putting down Syrian revolts with Senegalese troops. In contrast, in Iraq the British had been elastic and had contrived to use native Iraqi forces to put down disturbances. However, French policy under de Gaulle had

/turned

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turned over a new leaf and had shown great understanding for the Arabs. The implication was that we should do the same - and had not yet done so. In answer, as I said in my telegram, I tried to establish, and the President did not dissent, that we should talk over any misunderstandings that may arise in the future before proceeding to precipitate action.

*Yours ever*  
*JAG*

J A N Graham

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
BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

15 October 1974

P H R Wright Esq  
Middle East Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
LONDON

See later.



Alas. poor Taqa. I knew him well!

N. Clark 22/10  
N. Linn 21/x  
N. Brown 22/x

IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER

Enclosure N. R. (SS - said  
a program report?)

1. Thank you for sending us copies of the record of your meetings with Taqa of 3 and 4 October.

### Kurds

2. There is no doubt whatever that both the Director General of Public Relations (Kadhimi) and Jamali were told by me that you had refused to see the Kurdish dissidents in London. It is true (as you point out in your minute of 5 October) that Kadhimi did not mention this point when summing up our conversation of 5 August, but this is because his main concern was the alleged propaganda activities of the two ex-Ministers and their meeting with British subjects at the Hilton in June. As for Jamali, I made it clear to him that you had refused to see them in my interview of 26 September (my tel No. 345 para.5). I cannot, of course, say why the Minister was not informed. I think it not improbable that he was.

### Memorandum of Understanding

3. As you will know, I handed the draft Memorandum to Daoud, Director General of Economic Affairs at the Ministry, on 27 July. I have, on a number of occasions, asked those concerned how consideration of the Memorandum was progressing - I asked Taqa himself about it on 10 September. There appears to have been little progress.

4. It is typical of Taqa that, when discussing visas for staff in London, he should allege that where refusals or delays had taken place, this was because the staff concerned were Ba'athists. This is an old hobby horse of his. Both Ian McCluney (in his interviews with Taqa before my arrival) and I since, have made it quite clear to him that the fact that his staff in London are, or are not, members of the Ba'ath Party is irrelevant to the visa question.





- 2 -

5. Both interviews show Taqa to have been at his most mischievous. He enjoys argument, particularly with Westerners, and will often say the most outlandish things simply to needle one. The only defence is to state the facts as one knows them and stick by them. His machinations over the date of delivery of Cymbeline are typical of him, but his statement (paragraph 10 of your minute) that if they cannot have Cymbeline (and have it soon, which is what he really meant), it is far better to tell them now - should not be overlooked. We are headed for trouble on this if we do not make it clear soon that the export licence is not going to be held up.

*Yours etc*  
*R G*

R G Giddens






BRITISH EMBASSY  
BAGHDAD

3/3

27 October 1974

P R H Wright Esq  
Middle East Department  
F C/10

*John*



*Mr. C. J. 76/11*  
*A. B. 76/11*  
*pa*

*Dear Patrice,*

# ANGLO IRAQI RELATIONS

1. At long last I paid my first call this morning on the new Under Secretary in the MFA, Muhammad Sabri al Hadithi. He is in general charge of the political section of the Ministry dealing with non-Arab affairs, while Abdul Husain al Jamali deals with Arab affairs and certain protocol matters - I suppose foreign missions in Baghdad among them.
2. Muhammad Sabri has only been in the saddle 4 weeks, having previously been Iraqi Ambassador in Kuwait. He spoke warmly of Archie Lamb and apologised for not seeing me earlier, explaining, as I knew, that an appointment that we had had to meet last Monday had had to be cancelled because of the funeral of Shadhil Taqa. I then passed on the Secretary of State's condolences and explained how sorry Mr Callaghan had been that the meeting that had been arranged with Shadhil Taqa in London, on the latter's way from New York to Rabat, had not in the event materialised. Incidentally, we are passing on your own message to Zubaidi.
3. The conversation then turned to the general question of relations between Iraq and Britain. I recalled that the President had told me that he was looking forward to the turning of a new page and I said that we welcomed this and would do our best to reciprocate. I hoped that if any misunderstandings or differences arose, he or his Minister would allow me to come and talk the matter over with them candidly. Muhammad Sabri said that he welcomed this.
4. The conversation went on in this vein for a short time and I hope I did not spoil the atmosphere by raising two small bilateral matters, which affect the working of the Embassy but which I hope will not affect intergovernmental relations. These are, the position of 2 members of our Indian staff, whom the Iraqis have asked us to remove from the country, and a recent Note from the MFA requiring us to seek approval 2 weeks ahead of any moves either within or without the country. As I say,

/I



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I hope that we can settle these matters locally and I am not at this stage asking for any help from you. If, however, the notification of movements becomes too onerous, we may have to come back to you on this.

*Yours ever*  
*J A N*

J A N Graham

Copy to:

HE Mr A T Lamb, CMG MBE DFC  
Kuwait

CONFIDENTIAL





*Mr. Austin*  
*Mr. Clark*  
*19/12*  
**SECRET**

**BRITISH EMBASSY  
BAGHDAD**

*19w*  
**12 December 1974**

M S Weir Esq CMG  
Assistant Under-Secretary of State  
F C O

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 35 20 DEC 1974 NBR 3/548/4
--

*20/XII*  
*20/12*  
*pa*

*My dear Nicholas,*

**CALL ON THE IRAQI CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF**

I took advantage of my call on the Iraqi Chief of the General Staff, reported in my letter of 10 December, to say that we could readily sympathise with Iraq's irritation at the supply of foreign arms to the Kurds, since we had a similar problem in Northern Ireland where weapons were being used which were certainly not manufactured or available in Britain. Shanshal is very unlikely to be consulted if ever the question of supporting the IRA comes up, but I hope that if he is, he may perhaps bear this conversation in mind.

*Yours ever*  
*JAG*

**J A N Graham**

**SECRET**



File No. \_\_\_\_\_  
Department **PRIVATE OFFICE**  
Initiated by **J D F HOLT**  
(Block Capitals) \_\_\_\_\_  
Tel. Extn. **MA 52**

OUTWARD  
RECEIVED IN  
TELEGRAM  
REGISTRY N 35  
31 DEC 1974  
Date **30/12**  
NR **3/542/4**  
(Time) **2200** Z

Security Classification  
**UNCLASSIFIED**  
Precedence  
**PRIORITY**  
DESKBY \_\_\_\_\_ Z

FOR  
COMMS. DEPT.  
USE

Despatched

POSTBY \_\_\_\_\_ Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) **301933** Z(G.M.T.)  
(Security Class.) **Unclassified**  
(Codeword) \_\_\_\_\_  
(Restrictive Prefix) \_\_\_\_\_  
(Caveat/  
Privacy Marking) \_\_\_\_\_  
(Deskby) \_\_\_\_\_ Z

X TO **PRIORITY** **BAGHDAD** Tel. No. **361** of **30/12**  
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post) \_\_\_\_\_

AND SAVING TO \_\_\_\_\_

REPEATED TO (for info) \_\_\_\_\_

SAVING TO (for info) \_\_\_\_\_

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

1. Please pass the following message from the  
Secretary of State to His Excellency Field Marshal Ahmad  
Hassan Al Bakr and to His Excellency Dr Sa'adoun Hammadi.

Begins:

" I send you my very best wishes for the  
coming year.

James Callaghan."

Ends.

Copies to:-

MEJ

Pa  
30/12.



File No. \_\_\_\_\_  
Department PRIVATE OFFICE  
Drafted by J D F HOLT  
(Block Capitals) \_\_\_\_\_  
Tel. Extn. MA 52

~~SECRET~~ **MEI**  
OUTWARD  
TELEGRAM

Security Classification **(34)**  
UNCLASSIFIED  
Precedence  
PRIORITY

DESKBY \_\_\_\_\_

FOR  
COMMS. DEPT.  
USE

Despatched

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No 33  
(Date) 31 DEC 1974  
(Time) 1954/30  
Z

POSTBY \_\_\_\_\_

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) 301800 Z(G.M.T.)

(Security Class.) UNCLASSIFIED

(Restrictive Prefix) \_\_\_\_\_

(Caveat/  
Privacy Marking) \_\_\_\_\_

(Codeword) \_\_\_\_\_

(Deskby) \_\_\_\_\_

TO PRIORITY  
(precedence)

BAGHDAD  
(post)

Tel. No. 359 of 30/12

AND TO (precedence/post) \_\_\_\_\_

AND SAVING TO \_\_\_\_\_

REPEATED TO (for info) \_\_\_\_\_

SAVING TO (for info) \_\_\_\_\_

Distribution:-

**NENAD.**

[TEXT]

1. Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to **HIS EXCELLENCY FIELD MARSHAL AHMAD HASSAN AL BAKR.**

Begins:

"Mary and I send you our very best wishes  
for a peaceful and prosperous New Year.

Harold Wilson."

Ends.

**NO DISTRIBUTION**

Copies to:-

30/12

31/12



PP BAGHDAD

GPS35

EN CLAIR

FM FCO 301800Z

UNCLASSIFIED

TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD TELNO 359 OF 30 DECEMBER.

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER  
TO HIS EXCELLENCY FIELD MARSHAL AHMAD HASSAL AL BAKR.

BEGINS:

QUOTE MARY AND I SEND YOU OUR VERY BEST WISHES FOR A PEACEFUL  
AND PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR. HAROLD WILSON. UNQUOTE ENDS.

CALLAGHAN

NNNN



EMBASSY OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ21, QUEEN'S GATE,  
LONDON, S.W. 7.

No. 733

The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq presents its compliments to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and has the honour to request the cooperation of the Foreign Office in furnishing the Embassy with the regulations governing the conditions of diplomatic service for officers working in the United Kingdom and/or abroad, with special reference to overseas service, remunerations and additional allowances, general personnel procedures and any other details relevant to the above.

The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq, while thanking the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for their cooperation, avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the assurances of its highest consideration.

London, December 18th, 1974

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London.





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
BRITISH EMBASSY

BEIRUT

DA/59

N C R Williams Esq  
NENAD  
FCO

*Dear Williams,*



27 December 1974

*Mr. Williams. MED  
1/11/74. 3/1. pal.*

UK-IRAQ

On 18 December Colonel Mohammed Ismail Taha, Military Attaché at the Iraqi Embassy here, called on our Defence Attaché. In the course of conversation - which took place through an interpreter - he impressed on Maxwell Macfarlane the need for the establishment of close relations between Britain and Iraq. He spoke on this subject for about 30 minutes and expressed dismay at the lack of speed we were showing in getting together with the Iraqis. He thought that if we did not hurry the French would steal a march on us, and were perhaps already preparing to do so.

2. We think that Colonel Taha occupies a high and influential position in his Embassy. I have twice seen him at social functions in the company of the Iraqi Minister here, Dr Wahbi Karaghali, and there is no doubt at all about which of them is trying to make a good impression on the other.

*Yours etc*

*Ismail Gellagly*

*for* A C Thorpe

c.c. Chanceries:  
Baghdad  
Paris


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Copy to Republic of Ireland Dept.  
News Dept.

(37)



BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

19 December 1974

M S Weir Esq CMG  
Assistant Under-Secretary of State  
F C O

You might also have a word with GPD on the visit idea as they will certainly have handled requests from abroad.

Mr. Williams  
Mr. Burton  
I agree with Mr. Weir's comment on para. 3 but see whether any such arrangements

My dear Michael,

LAST PAPER

NORTHERN IRELAND

1. In the course of my discussion on 18 December with Tariq Aziz about Iraqi-Iranian relations and Oman, the Minister referred to Northern Ireland.

2. Taking him up, I said that he had spoken of the need for a political solution: this was easier said than done, as we knew only too well from our efforts in Northern Ireland. Making a fairly obvious point Tariq Aziz said that we could not have found the correct political answer. I said nevertheless we had brought about political arrangements under which the minority, through proportional representation, received a fair representation in the Assembly, and that the attempt had been largely defeated by a small body who believed it to be their right to compel by force of arms others to share their opinions. By and large, it was the moderates among the Catholics who had received support in the Northern Irish elections and, in the South, the political wing of the IRA received less than 1% of the vote. Their demands were not the demands of the people as a whole.

RID are mainly  
18/12/74  
5.15.1.75  
15.1.  
45/2/75

3. I have copied to McCaffrey a minute about the new Iraqi Ambassador's relations with the press in London with reference to the latter's reporting of Kurdistan. Northern Ireland is perhaps a subject mutatis mutandis, on which we could profitably expend some energy with the Iraqi Embassy, e.g. by arranging for the Ambassador to visit Belfast or to meet some of the Northern Irish Members of Parliament.

Not seen here.  
not much profit  
(par)

Yours ever

J A N Graham

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Record Of Conversations With Iraqi Officials With Regard To Anglo-Iraqi Relations; Situation Of Kurds. Political Relations Between Iraq And UK. 19 Dec. 1974. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 8/2317. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, [link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107472764/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=22a3885e&pg=1](https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107472764/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=22a3885e&pg=1). Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.